


# CS 261 Fall 2019

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## x86-64 Procedures

# Topics

- Procedure calls
  - Runtime stack
  - Control transfer
  - Data transfer
  - Local storage
  - Recursive procedures
  - Security issues

# Procedure calls

- A **procedure** is a portion of code packaged for re-use
  - Key abstraction in software development
  - Provide **modularity** and **encapsulation**
  - Many alternative names: functions, methods, subroutines
- Well-designed procedures have:
  - Well-documented, typed arguments and return value(s)
  - Clear impact on program state (or no impact)
    - Also known as “side effects”


# ABI

- **Application Binary Interface (ABI)**
  - Interface between program & system at the binary level
  - Includes rules about how procedure calls are implemented
  - These rules are referred to as **calling conventions**
  - We will study the standard x86-64 calling conventions
- Calling conventions specify:
  - Control transfer
  - Data transfer
  - Local storage

# Runtime stack

- Basic idea: maintain a system **stack frame** for each function call
  - All active functions have a frame
  - Each frame stores information about a single active call
    - Arguments, local variables, return address
  - GDB's "**backtrace**" command follows the chain up
  - Recursion just works!

Here function P has called function Q




# Control transfer

- Use stack to store return addresses
  - **Return address**: the instruction AFTER the `call`
  - `call` / `callq` pushes 64-bit return address onto stack
  - `ret` / `retq` pops the return address and sets `%rip`

```
400550 <main>:  
...  
400563 callq 400540 <foo>  
400568 movq 0x8(%rsp), %rdx  
...
```


```
400550 <foo>:  
400540 xorq %rax, %rax  
...  
40054d retq
```

<code>%rip</code>	0x400563
<code>%rsp</code>	0x7fffffff840




(a) Executing call

<code>%rip</code>	0x400540
<code>%rsp</code>	0x7fffffff838



(b) After call

<code>%rip</code>	0x400568
<code>%rsp</code>	0x7fffffff840



(c) After ret

# Data transfer

- In x86-64, up to six **integral** (integer or pointer) **arguments** are passed to a procedure via registers:
  - `%rdi`, `%rsi`, `%rdx`, `%rcx`, `%r8`, `%r9`
  - Other arguments are passed on the stack (and pushed in reverse order)
- A single **return value** is passed back via `%rax`
  - Large structs often returned via added pointer argument


# Local storage (registers)

- Some registers are designated **callee-saved**
  - In x86-64: `%rbx`, `%rbp`, `%r12`, `%r13`, `%r14`, `%r15`
  - A procedure must save/restore these registers (often using `push/pop`) if they are used during the procedure
  - When possible, avoid using these registers inside procedures (lower overhead)
- Other registers (except `%rsp`) are **caller-saved**
  - Caller must save them if they need to be preserved
  - The stack pointer is a special case (used for communication)



# Local storage (memory)

- Procedures can allocate space on the stack for **local variables**
  - Subtract # of bytes needed from `%rsp`
  - Deallocate by restoring old `%rsp` value
- Variable-sized allocations require special handling
  - Use **base / frame pointer** (`%rbp`) to track “anchor” for current frame
  - Save previous base pointer on stack at beginning of function
  - Section 3.10.5 in textbook



# Base pointers



CS 430/432 preview

- Use **base pointer** (%rbp) to track the beginning of current frame
  - Parameters at positive offsets
  - Local values at negative offsets
  - Chain of base pointers up the stack
  - Push/pop BP like return address

```
void foo()
{
    int a,b;
    bar(a);
    return;
}

void bar(x)
{
    int c;
    baz(x,c);
    return;
}

void baz(x,y)
{
    int d;
    return;
}
```




# Buffer overflows

- Major x86-64 security issue
  - C and assembly do not check for out-of-bounds array accesses
  - x86-64 stores return addresses and data on the same stack
  - Out-of-bound writes to local variables may overwrite other stack frames
  - Allows attackers to change control flow just by providing the right "data"
  - Many historical exploits (including Morris worm)

```
void echo ()  
{  
    // other code  
    // omitted  
  
    char buf[8];  
    gets(buf);  
    printf(buf);  
}
```

**DO NOT WRITE  
CODE LIKE THIS!**




# Buffer overflows

- Shellcode (exploit code)
  - Pre-compiled snippets of code that exploit a buffer overflow

```
char shellcode[] =  
    "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"  
    "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40xcd"  
    "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
```

Complication: Must pad the shellcode with address of the buffer (guess and/or use a NOP-sled)



# Mitigating buffer overflows

- Stack randomization
  - Randomize starting location of stack
  - Makes it more difficult to guess buffer address
  - In Linux: **address-space layout randomization**
- Corruption detection
  - Insert a **canary** (guard value) on stack after each array
  - Check canary before returning from function
- Read-only code regions
  - Mark stack memory as "no-execute"
  - Hinders just-in-time compilation and instrumentation

# Exercise

- Trace the following code--what is the value of %rax at the end?
  - Initial values: %rsp = 0x7fffffffef488, %rip = 0x4004e8

4004d6 <leaf>:

4004d6: 48 8d 7f 0f  
4004da: c3

**leaq** 0xf(%rdi),%rdi  
**retq**

4004db <top>:

4004db: 48 83 ef 05  
4004df: e8 f2 ff ff ff  
4004e4: 48 01 ff  
4004e7: c3

**subq** \$0x5,%rdi  
**callq** 4004d6  
**addq** %rdi,%rdi  
**retq**

4004e8 <main>:

4004e8: 48 c7 c7 64 00 00 00  
4004ef: e8 e7 ff ff ff  
4004f4: 48 89 f8  
4004f7: c3

**movq** \$100,%rdi  
**callq** 4004db  
**movq** %rdi,%rax  
**retq**