


CS 261 Fall 2018

Mike Lam, Professor



x86-64 Procedures

Topics

- Procedure calls
 - Runtime stack
 - Control transfer
 - Data transfer
 - Local storage
 - Recursive procedures
 - Security issues

Procedure calls

- A **procedure** is a portion of code packaged for re-use
 - Key abstraction in software development
 - Provide **modularity** and **encapsulation**
 - Many alternative names: functions, methods, subroutines
- Well-designed procedures have:
 - Well-documented, strongly-typed input arguments and return value(s)
 - Clear impact on program state (or no impact)
 - Also known as “side effects”


ABI

- **Application Binary Interface (ABI)**
 - Interface between program & system at the binary level
 - Includes rules about how procedure calls are implemented
 - These rules are referred to as **calling conventions**
 - We will study the standard x86-64 calling conventions
- Calling conventions specify:
 - Control transfer
 - Data transfer
 - Local storage

Runtime stack

- Basic idea: maintain a system **stack frame** for each function call
 - All active functions have a frame
 - Each frame stores information about a single active call
 - Arguments, local variables, return address
 - GDB's "**backtrace**" command follows the chain up
 - Recursion just works!

Here function P has called function Q




Control transfer

- Use stack to store return addresses
 - **Return address**: the instruction AFTER the `call`
 - `call` / `callq` pushes 64-bit return address onto stack
 - `ret` / `retq` pops the return address and sets `%rip`

```
400550 <main>:  
...  
400563  callq 400540 <foo>  
400568  mov 0x8(%rsp), %rdx  
...
```

```
400550 <foo>:  
400540  push %rbx  
...  
40054d  retq
```



(a) Executing `call`

Data transfer


- In x86-64, up to six **integral** (integer or pointer) **arguments** are passed to a procedure via registers:
 - %rdi, %rsi, %rdx, %rcx, %r8, %r9
 - Other arguments are passed on the stack (and pushed in reverse order)
- A single **return value** is passed back via %rax
 - Could be a pointer to a struct or array

Local storage (registers)

- Some registers are designated **callee-saved**
 - In x86-64: `%rbx`, `%rbp`, `%r12`, `%r13`, `%r14`, `%r15`
 - A procedure must save/restore these registers (often using push/pop) if they are used during the procedure
 - When possible, avoid using these registers inside procedures (lower overhead)
- Other registers (except `%rsp`) are **caller-saved**
 - Caller must save them if they need to be preserved
 - The stack pointer is a special case (used for communication)

Local storage (memory)

- Procedures can allocate space on the stack for **local variables**
 - Subtract # of bytes needed from `%rsp`
- Variable-sized allocations require special handling
 - Use **base / frame pointer** (`%rbp`) to track “anchor” for current frame
 - Save previous base pointer on stack at beginning of function
 - Section 3.10.5 in textbook



Base pointers



- Use **base pointer** (%rbp) to track the beginning of current frame
 - Parameters at positive offsets
 - Local values at negative offsets
 - Chain of base pointers up the stack
 - Push/pop BP like return address

```

void foo()
{
    int a,b;
    bar(a);
    return;
}

void bar(x)
{
    int c;
    baz(x,c);
    return;
}

void baz(x,y)
{
    int d;
    return;
}
    
```




Buffer overflows

- Major x86-64 security issue
 - C and assembly do not check for out-of-bounds array accesses
 - x86-64 stores return addresses and data on the same stack
 - Out-of-bound writes to local variables may overwrite other stack frames
 - Allows attackers to change control flow just by providing the right "data"
 - Many historical exploits (including Morris worm)

```
void echo ()  
{  
    // other code  
    // omitted  
  
    char buf[8];  
    gets(buf);  
    printf(buf);  
}
```

**DO NOT WRITE
CODE LIKE THIS!**




Buffer overflows

- Shellcode (exploit code)
 - Pre-compiled snippets of code that exploit a buffer overflow

```
char shellcode[] =  
    "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"  
    "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40xcd"  
    "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
```

Complication: Must pad the shellcode with address of the buffer (guess and/or use a NOP-sled)



Mitigating buffer overflows

- Stack randomization
 - Randomize starting location of stack
 - Makes it more difficult to guess buffer address
 - In Linux: **address-space layout randomization**
- Corruption detection
 - Insert a **canary** (guard value) on stack after each array
 - Check canary before returning from function
- Read-only code regions
 - Mark stack memory as "no-execute"
 - Hinders just-in-time compilation and instrumentation

Exercise

- Trace the following code--what is the value of %rax at the end?
 - Initial values: %rsp = 0x7fffffffef488, %rip = 0x4004e8

4004d6 <leaf>:

4004d6: 48 8d 7f 0f
4004da: c3

leaq 0xf(%rdi),%rdi
retq

4004db <top>:

4004db: 48 83 ef 05
4004df: e8 f2 ff ff ff
4004e4: 48 01 ff
4004e7: c3

subq \$0x5,%rdi
callq 4004d6
addq %rdi,%rdi
retq

4004e8 <main>:

4004e8: 48 c7 c7 64 00 00 00
4004ef: e8 e7 ff ff ff
4004f4: 48 89 f8
4004f7: c3

movq \$100,%rdi
callq 4004db
movq %rdi,%rax
retq